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Workmen's Compensation
By W. R. PATTERSON, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
This survey of appellate decisions should be prefaced with
a caveat. Many of the Kentucky Court of Appeals' opinions
during the 1974-75 term are irrelevant to the present or future
practice of workmen's compensation because the statutes
under which they were decided were radically revised in 1972.'
While the "new" Act provides a cornucopia of benefits, it also
poses numerous questions which will require judicial interpre-
tation. Although there is ample fuel for future appellate contro-
versy, only a few of these important problems have reached the
attention of our highest Court. Only those cases during the
preceding term which seem to indicate trends for the future will
be given consideration in this review.
2
I. EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE NEW ACT
A continuing source of confusion for practitioners has been
a clause in the 1972 revision of the Workmen's Compensation
Act which states: "This Act shall be effective on January 1,
1973; and effective for all claims filed on or after January 1,
1973. . . .-c A literal reading of this section indicates that the
new Act is applicable to a claim filed after January 1, 1973,
even if the injury that occasioned the claim occurred prior to
that date. The Court of Appeals was faced with precisely this
question in the companion cases Vater v. Newport Board of
Education and Early v. City of Newport.4 In both cases the
employees were injured during 1972, at which time neither they
*Partner in the firm of Landrum, Patterson & Dickey, Lexington, Kentucky. B.A.
1959, Vanderbilt University; J.D. 1963, University of Kentucky.
Ky. ACTS ch. 78 (1972).
2 To those who regularly practice in this area it goes without saying that the most
interesting developments during the past year have occurred at the administrative,
rather than the appellate level. Such developments include: increasing use of "wage
loss factor" to determine impairment of future earning capacity; a reluctance to apply
maximum limitations on compensation rates before multiplying by the occupational
disability factor; and, requests for all medical reports before approving settlements.
Ky. Acrs ch. 78, § 37 (1972).
511 S.W.2d 670 (Ky. 1974). The two cases were consolidated on appeal.
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nor their employers were bound by the then-existing Work-
men's Compensation Act, and both filed claims in 1973 under
the revised Act which mandated coverage of their employers.
The Court upheld dismissal of the claims citing two earlier
cases, in one of which, Maggard v. International Harvester
Co. ,5 it had said:
[T]he law in effect on the date of the injury or the date of
the last exposure, as the case may be, is the law that fixes the
rights of the claimant, and the filing date of the claim has no
bearing upon the award other than whether there has been a
compliance with the statute of limitations.,
Although this holding flies in the face of the explicit wording
of the statute, to have held otherwise would have created havoc
for employers and their insurers. The General Assembly could
not have intended to increase the liability of employers, as it
did by the revised Act's expanded employee benefits, without
notice or adequate time to provide for the increased benefits.
If the law in effect on the date of the injury fixes the rights
of the claimants, it would seem to follow that the old Act's 1-
year statute of limitations, as well as its limited benefits, is
applicable to any injury or exposure occurring prior to January
1, 1973, regardless of when the claim is actually filed. However,
an earlier case, Kiser v. Bartley Mining Co.,7 held that a statu-
tory amendment extending the limitations period was applica-
ble to claims which arose before the amendment, but which
were not yet barred by the previous limitation when the
amendment became effective. Thus, under Kiser, an employee
injured prior to January 1, 1973, whose claim under the old Act
was still viable on the effective date of the new Act, could avail
himself of the 2-year statute of limitations provided by the 1972
revision. The apparent inconsistency between the Kiser deci-
508 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. 1974). The other case cited was Thomas v. Crummies Creek
Coal Co., 179 S.W.2d 882 (Ky. 1944), in which the Court said: "The rights of the parties
in respect to compensation for injuries became fixed and vested on the date of the
injury." Id. at 883. In Vater the Court professed to rest its dismissal of the claims on a
"constitutional interpretation" made in Maggard and Thomas, 511 S.W.2d at 671, but
the relevancy of any constitutional claim is unclear, since the facts in Vater are unde-
veloped.
508 S.W.2d at 783.
7 397 S.W.2d 56 (Ky. 1965).
[Vol. 64
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
sion and the Court's ruling in Maggard, as adopted in the Vater
and Early cases, is difficult to reconcile. One is compelled to
agree with the view expressed by Justice Stewart, dissenting in
Kiser, that because the amount of compensation is fixed as of
the date of the injury, the time for filing a claim should be fixed
as of the same date.8
Since over 3 years have elapsed since January 1, 1973,
the effective date issue might appear academic. However, it
should be noted that Kentucky Revised Statutes § 342.185
[hereinafter cited as KRS], as originally amended in 1972,
provided that if payments of compensation had been made
voluntarily, a claim could be filed within 2 years after the
suspension of such payments. In 1974 this section was further
amended to provide that a claim must be filed within 2 years
following the date of an accident, or death, or within 1 year
following the suspension of such voluntary payments of com-
pensation, "whichever is later."9 Therefore, the 1- or 2-year
statute of limitations question may still be of practical import-
ance in those cases involving accidents or exposures prior to
January 1, 1973, where voluntary payments have been made.
II. UNINSURED EMPLOYER'S FUND
In Davis v. Turner,'" the Court undertook to harmonize
certain statutory inconsistencies concerning the Uninsured
Employer's Fund created by the 1972 amendments to the
Workmen's Compensation Act." At the time Turner was in-
jured in May of 1973, his employer had neither identified him-
self as an employer subject to the workmen's compensation
law, nor complied with KRS § 342.340(1), which requires em-
ployers to provide insurance or security against their liability
for workmen's compensation. The Board awarded Turner com-
pensation for total permanent disability against the Uninsured
Employer's Fund and gave the Fund subrogation rights against
Id. at 58.
Ky. AcTs ch. 93, § 2 (1974).
" 519 S.W.2d 820 (Ky. 1975).
" The Uninsured Employer's Fund was created to provide benefits to employees
'when there has been default in the payment of compensation due to the failure of an
employer to secure payment of compensation as provided by this chapter." Ky. REV.
STAT. § 342.760 [hereinafter cited as KRS].
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the employer. On appeal, the Fund claimed that the 1972
amendments to the Workmen's Compensation Act had not
eliminated the voluntary aspects of the old Act. Relying on
KRS §§ 342.390, 342.395, and 342.340(2), sections retained
from the old Act which refer to various aspects of the em-
ployer's election to operate under and his acceptance of the
Act, the Fund argued that Turner's employer was not required
to comply with the Act, since he had not elected to operate
under it.
The Court struggled to rationalize these provisions with
the following unambiguous language contained in the 1972 Act:
The following shall constitute employers mandatorily subject
to, and required to comply with, the provisions of this chap-
ter:
(1) Any person, other than one engaged solely in agri-
culture, that has in this state one or more employees subject
to this chapter.'
2
The Court resolved the conflict by attributing the General As-
sembly's failure to delete the old sections which refer to "elec-
tion" or "acceptance" to no more "than the reluctance of the
drafters of the 1972 Act to amend the entire section just to
eliminate a few words that were becoming surplusage."' Thus,
the Court concluded that the employer's obligation to provide
insurance or security is mandatory, not elective.
The Court further held that the employer's liability was
not limited to the Fund's subrogation claim; rather, he also had
a direct liability to the employee. The Fund's liability arises
only in the event of an employer's default in the payment of
compensation due the employee under the award. Therefore,
before an employee can recover against the Uninsured Em-
ployer's Fund, he apparently must sue in circuit court to en-
force the award and obtain judgment against the employer,
execute upon the judgment, and if returned "no property
found," then apply to the Board for an order directing the Fund
to make the payments. The imposition of such a burden on an
injured employee seems inconsistent with the language of KRS
§ 342.760(4), which imposes liability on the Fund "when there
2 KRS § 342.630 (1972).
519 S.W.2d at 822.
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has been a default in the payment of compensation due to the
failure of an employer to secure payment of compensation as
provided by this chapter.""4 It would be more equitable to allow
an employee to recover from the Fund upon proof that the
employer had not provided insurance or security, as required
by KRS § 342.340, than to require him to proceed against his
employer by a lawsuit.
III. SPECIAL FUND
The most significant case from the past court term involv-
ing a claim against the Special Fund is Yocom v. Gibbs.'5 In
Gibbs the Court interpreted the amended language of KRS §
342.120(1)(b), which states that the Special Fund shall be lia-
ble for compensating the arousal of a preexisting "dormant
disease or condition""8 into disabling reality by a subsequent
injury. Prior to the 1972 amendment, this section had imposed
liability on the Special Fund only in those cases involving the
arousal of a preexisting "dormant non-disabling disease condi-
tion." The subtle insertion of the word "or" between "disease"
and "condition" is of tremendous significance, as exemplified
by Gibbs, in which the Court was asked to determine whether
a preexisting spondylolisthesis fell within the definition of "dis-
ease or condition," thus rendering the Special Fund liable for
its subsequent arousal. Under the old Act, the Court of Appeals
had excluded spondylolisthesis and numerous other congenital,
psychological, and aging process conditions from the "disease
condition" category. 7
In the face of the Special Fund's argument that an adverse
I KRS § 342.305 (1972).
525 S.W.2d 744 (Ky. 1975).
' Emphasis supplied.
'7 See, e.g., Yocom v. Tri-County Sanitation Serv., 522 S.W.2d 850 (Ky. 1975)
(low emotional threshold); Yocom v. Fleming, 492 S.W.2d 194 (Ky. 1973)(hysterical
neurosis); Young v. Combs, 487 S.W.2d 906 (Ky. 1972)(degenerative disc disease);
Young v. Wright, 474 S.W.2d 76 (Ky. 1971)(congenital spina bifida); Giles Indus., Inc.
v. Neal, 471 S.W.2d 5 (Ky. 1972)(preexisting spondylolisthesis); Central Uniform
Rentals v. Richburg, 468 S.W.2d 268 (Ky. 1971)(obesity and hypertopic arthritis);
Young v. Pugh, 463 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. 1971) (active diabetes); Merit Clothing Co. v.
Jewell, 459 S.W.2d 88 (Ky. 1970)(preexisting personality structure); Young v. Polly,
458 S.W.2d 780 (Ky. 1970)(embryonic malformation causing deformity); Ashland
Crafts, Inc. v. Young, 451 S.W.2d 607 (Ky. 1970)(sensitivity to cotton fibers).
1975]
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ruling would probably bankrupt the Fund, the Court specifi-
cally held that spondylolisthesis qualifies as a "disease or con-
dition" when aroused into disabling reality by a subsequent
compensable injury, and that the Special Fund must bear part
of the compensation burden. 8 The Court made it quite clear
that its construction of the unqualified word "condition" is
limited to the facts of the Gibbs case and is no barometer of
any future willingness to find other preexisting problems to be
"conditions." 9 However, if spondylolisthesis is a "condition,"
then it appears that congential defects, degenerative disc dis-
ease, osteoarthritis, and other similar problems would likewise
be considered "conditions." Whether obesity, one's preexisting
personality structure, or other less pathological problems will
be found to be "conditions" under the Act is more question-
able.
A rather important procedural question involving the Spe-
cial Fund was decided by the Court in Yocom v. Jordan Auto
Parts Co."' In Jordan, the employee and the employer decided
to settle, but the Special Fund refused to participate in the
settlement. The agreement reached between the employee and
the employer was submitted to the Board, approved, and be-
came an award of the Board.2 1 The employer then filed an
"Application for Adjustment of Claim" against the Special
Fund seeking to recover all sums which it had paid to the
employee on the ground that the employee's disability had
resulted from the arousal of a preexisting latent disease condi-
tion. The Board sustained the Special Fund's motion to dis-
miss and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Court held that
an employer may not settle a claim with an employee and then,
by an independent proceeding, seek to recover its payment
from the Special Fund.2 2 If the Special Fund refuses to volun-
tarily contribute to the settlement of a claim, the employer or
the employee must file an application pursuant to KRS §
342.370 for a full adjudication of all the issues in controversy,
including the potential liability of the Fund.
11 525 S.W.2d at 746.
19 Id.
20 521 S.W.2d 519 (Ky. 1975).
22 The Board's approval was pursuant to KRS § 342.265 (1960).
521 S.W.2d at 521.
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Such a requirement may serve to impede the settlement
process and increase the volume of litigation before the Board.
It is the writer's experience that the Special Fund will seldom,
if ever, voluntarily contribute toward a settlement. Employers
often believe that an employee is entitled to compensation ben-
efits, but are rarely willing to bear the entire brunt of the
award. They should be able to settle with an employee, pay the
entire award and seek an apportionment from the Special
Fund, thereby permitting employees to receive benefits with-
out waiting for a resolution of the dispute between the em-
ployer and the Special Fund.
IV. CAUSATION-HEART ATTACKS
The most significant workmen's compensation decision
handed down during the past term was Moore v. Square D
Co., 2 in which the Court of Appeals apparently dispensed with
the necessity of proving by expert medical testimony that heart
attacks are probably work-related. Square D represents an ab-
rupt departure from the long-standing rule in this jurisdiction
that causation must be proved by expert testimony, when it is
a matter outside the realm of common knowledge.24 It appears
to now be the rule in Kentucky that in heart attack cases fact
finders may form their judgments about causation on the basis
of the "totality of the circumstances, '2 even though there is no
medical evidence of the probability of work-causation.
Moore, who had a history of heart problems, suffered a
myocardial infarction while on the job as an assembly line
worker. A Board-appointed physician testified that Moore's
heart attack was "merely coincidental" to his work, and an-
other doctor would only state that Moore's work activities
"could have been" a cause of the heart attack.26 Neither was
- 518 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1975).
24 Expert opinion is required when "the factual situation is so far out of the
practical experience of jurors that they are likely to be incapable of forming a correct
judgment without expert assistance." O'Conner & Raque Co. v. Bill, 474 S.W.2d 344,
347 (Ky. 1971). "However, the conclusion reached in this case does not mean we are
departing from the rule requiring medical evidence to show causation when the
claimed internal or external injuries allegedly resulting from the accident are not
within the realm of common knowledge." Tatham v. Palmer, 439 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Ky.
1969).




willing to say that the heart attack was probably caused by a
work-connected event.
The Board found that the heart attack had arisen out of
Moore's employment, in the sense that his work was a causa-
tive factor, and awarded him permanent disability. The circuit
court reversed, partly on the strength of Kelly Contracting Co.
v. Robinson,27 in which the Court of Appeals had clearly held
that expert testimony that a heart occlusion "could have" been
work-related was mere conjecture, and that medical testimony
of a probable work-related cause was a prerequisite to recovery
of workmen's compensation benefits.
The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, basing its
opinion on an extension of the principles it had ennunciated in
Hudson v. Owens,"5 which it said had implicitly overruled
Kelly Contracting Co., although Hudson had not mentioned
Kelly by name. 29 In Hudson, the Court affirmed the Board's
finding that the claimant's death was not work-related, despite
medical testimony that the stress and strain of work was a
cause of his death. Thus, in Hudson v. Owens the Board was
permitted to find from the "totality of the circumstances" that
a heart attack was not work-related, even though there was
medical testimony that it probably was." In Square D the
Court said:
The question here is whether the proposition stated in Hud-
son v. Owens, that medical evidence is not to be exclusively
determinative but that the board shall make the factual de-
termination, from the totality of the circumstances, of
whether there was a work-connected event, means what it
appears to say-that medical testimony is not exclusively
27 377 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. 1964). The trial court also relied on Markwell & Hartz,
Inc. v. Pigman, 473 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1971), in which the Court of Appeals reversed an
award in favor of an employee for the loss of hearing, allegedly caused by his operation
of a jackhammer, because a medical expert would only state that the disability "could
have resulted" from exposure to the noise.
' 439 S.W.2d 565 (Ky. 1969).
' The Court said in Moore v. Square D Co.:
As concerns Kelly Contracting Company v. Robinson, the line of cases of
which the case is representative was overruled, on the point here in issue,
by Hudson v. Owens. Kelly clearly was embraced in the overruled group,
though not mentioned by name.
518 S.W.2d at 783.
11 439 S.W.2d at 569-70.
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determinative either that there was a work-connected event
or was not such an event. We think it does.
31
Hudson and Square D are two sides of the same coin.
Hudson permits the Board to find that a heart attack was not
work-related despite medical testimony that it probably was,
while Square D permits the Board to find that a heart attack
was work-related in the absence of medical testimony that it
probably was. Although the Square D holding is an extension
of Hudson, it was not an extension made out of logical necess-
ity, as the Court seems to imply. Given that a trier-of-fact was
permitted in Hudson to reject an expert's testimony, it does not
necessarily follow that the Board can decide that a heart attack
was work-related, in the absence of expert medical testimony
to that effect. In other words, the Court could have decided
Squre D differently; it was not bound by Hudson to decide
Square D as it did.
Hudson v. Owens was merely a case in which the Work-
men's Compensation Board, as factfinder, chose to reject the
evidence of the medical expert who testified that there was a
causal relationship between the heart attack and the em-
ployee's work. Hudson did not expressly or implicitly dispense
with the necessity of expert medical testimony to establish
causation. In fact, in 1972 Hudson was cited by the Court in
Parker Seal Co. v. Russell3 for the proposition that "[a] possi-
bility of causal connection is not enough to support a finding
of such causation as a fact.
'3
This author is of the opinion that Moore v. Square D Co.
represents neither a reasonable nor a practical approach to the
problems facing the Court in heart attack cases. Such cases
often involves persons who are permanently and totally dis-
abled, and under our present Workmen's Compensation Act
they can involve awards in excess of $150,000.3 They are impor-
tant cases with serious consequences to both sides. Instead of
permitting lay persons to speculate about complicated medical
1' 518 S.W.2d at 783.
32 487 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1972).
3 Id. at 282.
31 A 25-year-old man totally disabled in 1975 would draw $164,584.56 over his
anticipated life expectancy of 38.81 years, based upon the mortality and
compensation-benefit tables currently used by the Workmen's Compensation Board.
1975]
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questions without the assistance of expert medical testimony,
it would seem more appropriate to maintain a consistent posi-
tion throughout all fields of personal injury litigation.3 5 Expert
medical testimony should be required in those cases which in-
volve matters beyond the realm of common lay experience.
The Court said in Square D that "heart attack cases fall
into a special class of their own, to which historically and nec-
essarily, special rules have been applied." 3 However, it did not
define this "special class," nor did it tell us where historically,
or why necessarily, special rules have been applied. Surpris-
ingly, an article by Professor Larson, cited as authority for this
statement, seems to support a contrary position.
7
If in fact "heart attack cases fall into a special class of their
own," 38 is not the Court usurping a legislative function in mak-
ing such a distinction? The Court seemed to recognize this in
Hudson v. Owens when it said that "there is no statutory basis
for treating preexisting heart disease in a different category
from any other form of preexisting disease." 9 The General As-
sembly has clearly not differentiated heart attacks from any
other "harmful change in the human organism."40 If it had
intended to treat heart attacks specially, it would have created
special provisions as it has for claims involving pneumocon-
iosis, loss of hearing, and scheduled benefits for loss of body
members.'
1 See note 23, supra, and accompanying text.
" 518 S.W.2d at 784.
7 Larson, The "Heart Cases" in Workmen's Compensation: An Analysis and
Suggested Solution, 65 MICH. L. REV. 441, 468-69 (1967):
The beginning point in any attempt to articulate a sound working rule for
the heart cases is the recognition of the fact that, while limits must be put
on heart liability, the essence of the problem is causation. The fact that an
increasing number of jurisdictions accept this beginning point is a step in
the right direction, but there is one additional preliminary step which is
indispensable to an orderly analysis and that is to recognize that the causa-
tion question has two distinct parts: the legal and medical. The law must
define what kind of exertion satisfies the test of "arising out of the employ-
ment"; then the doctors must say whether the exertion which has been held
legally sufficient to support compensation has in fact caused the heart at-
tack.
31 518 S.W.2d at 784.
"' 439 S.W.2d 565, 568 (Ky. 1969).
10 See KRS § 342.620(1), which defines the term "injury."
41 KRS §§ 342.316, .730.
[Vol. 64
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The most disturbing aspect of Square D is not the Court's
holding. Admittedly, the question of medical causation in
heart attack cases is a subject about which the most knowl-
edgeable experts disagree. Most unsettling to practitioners is
the apparent demise of stare decisis as a viable working princi-
ple in workmen's compensation cases. The Court's willingness
in Hudson v. Owens to overrule a decision handed down only
two years before,42 plus its statement in Square D that Hudson
had "clearly" overruled Kelly Contracting Co. v. Robinson
"though not mentioned by name, 4 3 and the citation of Kelly
Contracting Co. with approval in no less than five decisions
after it was said to have been overruled," indicate the confu-
sion that is necessarily felt by the practicing bar.
V. LUMP SUM SETTLEMENTS OF MEDICAL TREATMENT BENEFITS
In Simpson County Lumber Co. v. Brown,45 the Court of
Appeals, in a case of first impression, upheld an agreement for
the payment of lump sum medical treatment benefits. The
employer and the employee entered into a final settlement
agreement, subject to the approval of the Board, whereby the
employee was to receive $50,000 in a lump sum and a $10,000
insurance policy to cover medical expenses. The Board ap-
proved the $50,000 payment, but refused to approve the medi-
cal expense settlement. The circuit court affirmed the Board's
decision, but was reversed by the Court of Appeals, which
stated: "We are of the opinion that in compensation cases med-
ical expense is a proper subject of a compensation settlement
and the settlement should be approved unless it is manifestly
unfair to the employee."4
42 See Trailer Convoys, Inc. v. Holschlaw, 419 S.W.2d 563 (Ky. 1967) which was
the most recent case in a group of cases overruled or modified to the extent that they
were inconsisent with Hudson.
43 518 S.W.2d 781, 783 (Ky. 1975). See note 28 supra.
" Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. Pigman, 473 S.W.2d 842 (Ky. 1971); Witt v. Greer
Bros. & Young, Inc., 465 S.W.2d 286 (Ky. 1971); Purchase Area Economic Opportunity
Council, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Bd., 459 S.W.2d 604 (Ky. 1970); Tatham
v. Palmer, 439 S.W.2d 938 (Ky. 1969); Inland Steel Co. v. Johnson, 439 S.W.2d 562
(Ky. 1969). Particular attention is directed to the opinions in Witt v. Greer Bros. &
Young, Inc. and Markwell & Hartz, Inc. v. Pigman in which both Kelly Contracting
Co. and Hudson are discussed.
' 520 S.W.2d 312 (Ky. 1975).
' Id. at 313.
1975]
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Simpson relieves the dilemma in which many employers
and their insurance carriers have found themselves when desir-
ing to enter into a final lump sum settlement agreement with
an employee. While there generally have been no problems in
obtaining Board approval of a lump sum settlement of compen-
sation benefits, settlements of medical treatment benefits have
lacked finality because of the possibility of future claims for
additional medical expenses.
Although the Court held that such settlements "should be
approved unless . . .manifestly unfair to the employee, 47 it
is the writer's experience that the Board will carefully and
deliberately scrutinize each of these settlements to ascertain
that the interests of the employee are being adequately pro-
tected. Although this is as it should be, the Board's reluctance
to approve such settlements will obviously meet with the disap-
proval of both sides, who desire to settle their differences with-
out further litigation. The language of the opinion appears to
make it mandatory upon the Board to approve such settle-
ments, except where "manifestly unfair" to the employee. A
determination of the criteria for a finding of "manifest unfair-
ness" will have to await future appeals.
VI. PROCEDURE AND APPEAL
In Yocom v. Payne,4" the Court was asked to determine
whether petitions for reconsideration filed by two defendants
pursuant to KRS § 342.281 extended the time allowed for a
third defendant to appeal to the circuit court. The case ac-
tually involved separate claims against two defendants, Parish
Avenue and Baird, which were consolidated at the Board level.
Awards were made for 25 percent permanent partial disability
against both defendants, and an award of 50 percent disability
was made against the Special Fund, because the case involved
the arousal of a preexisting, dormant, nondisabling disease
condition. The award was entered on September 20, 1971, and
within the 14-day limit prescribed by KRS § 342.281, petitions
for reconsideration were filed by Parish Avenue and Baird.
47 Id.
4- 512 S.W.2d 517 (Ky. 1974).
[Vol. 64
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None was filed by the Special Fund. On October 4, 1971, the
Board overruled the petition filed by Parish Avenue, and on
November 8, 1971, it overruled Baird's petition. KRS § 342.285
provides that an appeal to the circuit court must be taken
within 20 days of the entry of a final award or order of the
Board. Therefore, on October 14, 1971, Parish Avenue filed its
appeal in the circuit court. Baird appealed on November 22,
1971, and the Special Fund filed its appeal on November 26,
1971.
The circuit court determined that the Special Fund's ap-
peal was not timely filed. In reversing, the Court of Appeals
held that the Special Fund was under no obligation to file a
petition for reconsideration. When Baird and Parish Avenue
filed their petitions for reconsideration, the finality of the
award was destroyed; the entire case was held in abeyance as
to all parties until the last of the two petitions had been over-
ruled. That the Board entered separate orders at different
times on the two petitions did not affect the Fund's appeal
deadline. The Court noted:
When the last petition was overruled, the award again be-
came final and the time for appeal to the circuit court as
provided in KRS § 342.285 again commenced. To hold other-
wise would be to set a series of procedural traps and to invite
premature appeals to the circuit courts.49
The Court's decision was obviously justified. To have
forced the Special Fund to file by October 10, which would
have been 20 days after the original award, would have meant
that the Fund would have had to appeal nearly a month before
the Board ruled on Baird's petition for reconsideration. The
Fund could hardly have filed an intelligent appeal before it
knew the contents of the Board's final ruling.
Justice Jones filed a dissenting opinion in the Payne case
which may cause some confusion among the practicing bar.
Although he thought the Fund's appeal was not timely filed,
he apparently would have allowed it a 34-day period to file an
appeal with the circuit court, instead of the 20-day period men-




tioned by KRS § 342.285.' Thus, the Fund would have had
through October 24, instead of October 10, to file an appeal.
His theory is that an award of the Board is not final until the
14-day period for filing a petition for reconsideration has
elapsed, and that an appeal can only be taken from a final
award. Thus, under Justice Jones' approach, the 20-day appeal
period begins running at the end of the 14 days which are
allowed for a petition for reconsideration.
Although his analysis is reasonable and persuasive, it does
not seem to comport with the wording of KRS § 342.285(1)
which provides in part:
An award or order of the board as provided in KRS 342.275,
if petition for reconsideration is not filed as provided for in
KRS 342.281, shall be conclusive and binding as to all ques-
tions of fact, but either party may within twenty (20) days
after the rendition of such final award or order of the board,
by petition appeal to the circuit court ....
After 14 days an award of the Board becomes "conclu-
sive." However, the statutory language indicates that the final-
ity achieved after 14 days relates back to the rendition of the
award. The 20-day appeal period runs from the "rendition" of
the final award. By "rendition" the statute must refer to the
date of the original award, since the Board takes no additional
affirmative acts, within the meaning of "rendition," if no peti-
tion for reconsideration is filed. Until this matter is clarified by
the Court of Appeals, practitioners would be wise to take the
safer course and file all appeals within 20 days after an original
award is rendered, in the absence of a petition for reconsidera-
tion.
11 Justice Jones said:
I am of the opinion that the appeal by the Special Fund was not timely filed.
KRS § 342.285(1) states that a party shall have twenty days from the rendi-
tion of a final award in which to take an appeal to a circuit court. In the
Parish Avenue proceeding in which the Special Fund was a defendant the
opinion and award of the Board was entered on September 20, 1971, and
absent a petition for rehearing by the Special Fund became final as to the
Special Fund on October 4, 1971. KRS 342.281. The Special Fund had only
twenty days from that date within which to take an appeal. I am further of
the opinion that the appeal filed by the Special Fund in the Baird proceeding




In another opinion, Carnahan v. Yocom, 2 the Court dis-
cussed the necessity of filing a responsive answer to a petition
for review in the circuit court. An employee failed to file a
responsive pleading and the Special Fund was granted a de-
fault judgment. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that a
respondent named in a petition for review, upon appeal from
an order of the Workmen's Compensation Board, must file an
answer within the 15-day period prescribed by KRS §
342.285(2).
It is not clear whether the requirement that an answer be
filed is also applicable to the Workmen's Compensation Board.
KRS § 342.285 provides in part that the "Board shall be named
respondent" in any appeal, and the Court has previously held
that the Board is not merely a nominal party. 3 By implication,
one is led to believe that the Board should be required to file
an answer; however, this has not been the general practice.
Apparently, the Board would be required to answer allegations
of fraud or misconduct by officials who administer the Act, and
it might be required to answer in those cases in which an appeal
is from a decision of the Board which refuses to approve an
agreed settlement between the parties.
VII. REOPENING OF AWARDS
During the past term the Court of Appeals took a hard line
concerning the grounds upon which an award can be reopened
under KRS § 342.125. In Yocom v. Meade, 4 an employee
sought to reopen an earlier award in which he had been granted
a 25% permanent partial disability, based upon evidence of a
traumatic injury to his back and a preexisting psychoneurosis.
The Workmen's Compensation Board reopened the case and
awarded permanent total disability, and the circuit court af-
firmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, noting that there was
evidence in the record that the employee had been totally disa-
bled by the psychoneurosis prior to his traumatic injury. It said
that if the disability existed at the time of the original award,
it could not now constitute a change in condition which would
52 526 S.W.2d 301 (Ky. 1975).
"3 See Scott Bros. Logging & Lumber Co. v. Cobb, 465 S.W.2d 241 (Ky. 1971).
N' 514 S.W.2d 687 (Ky. 1974).
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support a motion to reopen, even if there had been no evidence
of it before the Board.
In Royal Crown Bottling Co. v. Jones,55 a motion to reopen
was denied on the basis that the employee knew of the condi-
tion about which he was presently complaining prior to the
time he executed an agreement for the settlement of his earlier
claim. The Court held that although the employee had "frit-
tered away a valid claim for total disability when he settled for
lump sum benefits," he was "bound by the agreement.""
In a later opinion, Central City v. Anderson,57 the Court
reversed an award of the Workmen's Compensation Board
granted on a motion to reopen, observing: "There is not so
much as an ectoplasmic vapor of evidence to indicate that the
appellee, Anderson, is any more of a dreg on the employment
market now than he was at the time of the settlement."-"
These cases seem to indicate a trend by the Court toward
rejecting motions to reopen, unless the conditions existing at
the time of the filing of the motion are considerably different
from those at the time of the earlier settlement or award. It
should be noted that in 1972 the General Assembly added
"newly discovered evidence" as a ground upon which a motion
to reopen could be sought under KRS § 342.125. Previously, the
only grounds had been change of conditions, mistake or fraud.
To date, no appellate decision has defined "newly discovered
evidence." However, the above cases seem to indicate that this
new ground will afford little, if any, additional relief.
VIII. OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE
Chapman v. Eastern Coal Corp.59 and Fugate v. United
States Steel Corp.6 are two occupational disease cases from the
past Court term which point out certain statutory inequities
created by the 1972 amendments to Kentucky's Workmen's
Compensation Act. The 1972 amendments substantially in-
creased the amount and duration of benefits payable to work-
No. 74-829 (Ky., Jan 31, 1975)(memorandum opinion per curiam).
5' Id. at 3.
57 521 S.W.2d 246 (Ky. 1975).
-' Id. at 247.
59 519 S.W.2d 390 (Ky. 1975).
60 528 S.W.2d 691 (Ky. 1975).
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men's compensation claimants. However, chapter 78, § 37 of
the amendments6' specifically provides that the increased ben-
efits are inapplicable to "those claims where benefits are
awarded under the federal law." '62 At present, benefits are
awarded under federal law to black lung claimants pursuant to
the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969.63 Conse-
quently, the increased benefits provided by the 1972 amend-
ments are not payable to black lung claimants.
The purpose of the federal act was to provide benefits to
black lung claimants in states which paid compensation below
federal standards.64 Kentucky claimants will continue to be
eligible for federal awards until the United States Secretary of
Labor lists Kentucky as providing "adequate coverage for
pneumoconiosis"6 5 or until 1981, whichever is earlier.
Ironically, the 1972 amendments provide substantially
greater state black lung benefits than are awarded under fed-
eral law, yet under Kentucky Acts, chapter 78, § 37, the in-
creased state benefits are not payable until the federal awards
are no longer available. Even more ironic, benefits under the
federal awards, which were originally payable by the federal
government, have been paid by employers since January 1,
1974.6 Therefore, if the rationale of § 37 was originally to take
advantage of federal funds, that rationale is no longer viable.
In both Chapman and Fugate, black lung claimants were
forced to accept substantially smaller awards than they would
otherwise have been entitled to under the 1972 Kentucky
amendments merely because they were also covered by federal
law. Even though they were subject to federal law, any award,
' Ky. ACrs ch. 78, § 37 (1972).
(2 Id. Section 37 provides more fully that:
... .in the event federal law specifies that claims covered by provisions of
this Act shall be filed with a federal agency such claims shall continue to be
filed as required by the federal law until repeal or expiration of the federal
law requiring same; then, in that event, the increase in benefits provided
herein shall not apply to those claims where benefits are awarded under the
federal law. The benefits under the present law KRS Chapter 342 shall apply
to those claims.
30 U.S.C. §§ 801, 901 et seq. (1970).
1, 519 S.W.2d at 392.
20 C.F.R. § 722.152 (1975).
1 519 S.W.2d at 392.
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whether state or federal, was payable by their employers. This
result is both inequitable and illogical, and the General Assem-
bly should seriously consider revising § 37.
